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COMMENT ON LAURENCE CLAUS, 
THE DIVIDED EXECUTIVE 
MARGARET H. LEMOS* 
In The Divided Executive, Professor Claus offers a provocative 
proposal to vest Congress—rather than the President—with the power 
to remove the Attorney General (“AG”), and to further insulate the 
AG by conditioning removal on a finding of good cause and a two-
thirds vote of both houses of Congress.1 Building on his earlier work, 
Professor Claus grounds the proposal in a theory of separation of 
powers that (contra Montesquieu) emphasizes the importance of intra-
institutional checks and balances.2 This brief response largely ignores 
that rich theoretical backdrop in favor of a more pedestrian approach 
that focuses on the nature of the AG’s job and on potential downsides 
of moving control over that particular position outside of the executive 
branch. 
Professor Claus’s proposal is motivated by discomfort with the 
President’s power to dismiss the AG, or the AG’s subordinates at the 
Department of Justice, at will—and a desire to create more checks on 
the President within the executive branch. More specifically, Professor 
Claus focuses on the need for independence for government actors 
who may need to prosecute others in government. That is an 
understandable impulse in the current political moment, and Professor 
Claus is hardly alone in worrying about a state of affairs in which the 
President can effectively immunize himself and his allies by firing any 
AG who dares to shine the prosecutorial light on the executive branch 
itself. 
 
Copyright © 2018 Margaret H. Lemos. 
*Robert G. Seaks LL.B. ‘34 Professor of Law, Duke University. These informal comments were 
prepared for the Symposium on Amending the Constitution, held at Duke Law School on Feb. 2, 
2018. I am grateful to the editors of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy for 
inviting me to participate, and to Professor Claus for his thought-provoking contribution. 
 1.  Laurence Claus, The Divided Executive, 13 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 25, 25–26 
(2018). 
 2.  See generally Laurence Claus, Montesquieu’s Mistakes and the True Meaning of 
Separation, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2005). 
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But the AG does a great deal more than prosecute crimes, generally, 
and crimes by executive actors, specifically. The AG also stands atop an 
organizational hierarchy that is responsible for the civil side of federal 
law enforcement, including control of litigation for much of the vast 
administrative state.3 Is that a power that we want to vest in an 
appointed official who’s formally independent from the President, 
removable only by a supermajority vote in Congress? I’m not sure. The 
primary reason for my hesitation is that, in my view, law-execution is an 
unavoidably political endeavor given the scope of federal law today. 
When I say “political,” I don’t mean partisan. But I do mean that the 
exercise of enforcement discretion entails contestable policy judgments 
that, it seems to me, call for some meaningful form of democratic 
accountability. 
To be sure, there are lots of reasons to doubt that there is 
meaningful democratic accountability when it comes to the actions of 
the federal AG, and in other work I have suggested various mechanisms 
for improving transparency and accountability.4 Professor Claus is 
working at the other end of the spectrum: he thinks there should be 
even less in the way of political checks and more independence for the 
AG—along the lines of judicial independence. Indeed, at several points 
in his argument, Professor Claus suggests a similarity between 
prosecutors and judges. For example, he quotes Lord Camden, who was 
England’s AG in the mid-1700s, as saying that he “interposed himself 
as a judicial officer between the executive Government and the subject; 
that he acted as a kind of referee, accountable to both parties, by a tacit 
compact for sound and virtual exercise of discretion.”5 Professor Claus 
also notes that an early draft of the Judiciary Act provided for the 
 
 3.  For discussions of DOJ control of agency litigation, see, for example, Neal Devins & 
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 J. 
CONST. L. 558, 560–61 (2003); Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control 
of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368–69 (2000). 
 4.  See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence for 
the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929 (2017) (suggesting reforms to “sunshine” and 
recusal rules, restrictions on lobbying, and regulations of state attorney general elections to 
promote greater transparency around efforts to influence broad enforcement policy, and greater 
accountability for government enforcement generally). My work has focused primarily on civil 
law enforcement. For articles exploring similar themes for local prosecutors, see, for example, 
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 959 (2009); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial 
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939 (1997); Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 
S.M.U. L. REV. 593 (2014); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 581 (2008). 
 5.  Claus, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting 5 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD 
CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 360 (1846)). 
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United States AG to be appointed by the Supreme Court rather than 
the President.6 And he argues that “[t]aking care that the laws are 
faithfully executed no more requires an unlimited presidential power 
to dismiss the Attorney General than it requires an unlimited 
presidential power to dismiss judges, whose decisions are just as 
integral to the law’s faithful execution.”7 
It’s not a wild idea to think of prosecutors as analogous to judges. 
Other scholars have argued that prosecutors—and government lawyers 
more generally—have a duty to “seek justice.”8 The point is to 
distinguish the prosecutor’s job from that of a private lawyer, whose 
obligation is to advocate zealously in favor of her client’s position, 
whatever that happens to be. Put somewhat differently, we might think 
of the “client” of the government lawyer as the public itself, and 
conclude that zealous advocacy on behalf of the public means 
something like trying to do what’s right and just, all things considered.9 
That ideal is reflected in an inscription that rings the space outside the 
AG’s office: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done 
its citizens in the courts.”10 
There is a quasi-judicial cast to this conception of the AG’s job, 
suggesting (as in the quote from Lord Camden) that the prosecutor is 
serving as something of a referee and not just blindly pursuing a 
conviction.11 But that’s still quite different from “calling balls and 
strikes,” as Chief Justice Roberts famously—or maybe infamously—
described the job of a judge.12 It’s also different from less formalistic 
understandings of judging that allow for legal indeterminacy and the 
inevitability of difficult judgment calls. Even if we acknowledge that 
the law does not always supply clear answers to the questions judges 
must answer, we can nevertheless distinguish between judicial and 
prosecutorial discretion. Judges must do their best to fairly resolve the 
 
 6.  See id.. 
 7.  Id. at 8. 
 8.  E.g., Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 269 (2000). 
 9.  Cf. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2138 (2004) (“Many public attorneys . . . consider ‘the public’ or 
‘the public interest’ as their real client in interest; the agency or government official to whom they 
report is simply an intermediary form of that principal.”). 
 10.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (invoking the quote). 
 11.  See Lemos, supra note 4, at 956–63 (exploring similarities between public enforcement 
and judging). 
 12.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55, 56 (2005) 
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
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cases that come to them, but prosecutors do much more than that. 
Prosecutors also make a slew of discretionary choices about which 
offenses to prioritize, what kinds of sanctions to seek, and what 
violations to ignore. And, given the prevalence of settlement and plea 
bargaining, in many cases prosecutors determine not only which actions 
to pursue, but also how to resolve them. Those are not just debatable 
judgments about the best way to understand the laws on the books, akin 
to the sorts of judgments judges must make. They’re policy decisions 
about what to do with that law. 
Importantly for present purposes, such policy decisions may well 
shift from one presidential administration to the next. Federal policy 
on marijuana prosecutions is one recent and obvious example, but 
there are plenty more. Deciding whether or not to devote prosecutorial 
resources to a particular category of offense is not the kind of thing 
we’d expect judges to do, or even to weigh in on. Indeed, that’s one 
reason why judges generally refuse to second-guess the exercise of 
prosecutorial or enforcement authority: because they recognize that it 
turns on a host of strategic and policy-based considerations that lie 
outside of the law. As the Court explained in Heckler v. Chaney,13 
enforcement decisions “often involve[] a complicated balancing of a 
number of factors which are peculiarly within [the relevant agency’s] 
expertise,” including “whether agency resources are best spent on this 
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, 
whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the 
agency’s overall policies, and . . . whether the agency has enough 
resources to undertake the action at all.”14 The Court was talking about 
civil enforcement—a significant part of the AG’s job, as I’ve noted—
but similar points hold on the criminal side as well. All of which is to 
say that the political independence of federal judges does not translate 
neatly or easily to the independence of the AG and her subordinates. 
Granted—as Professor Claus emphasizes—it is the case that most 
state AGs are independent from the Governor, so the structure he 
proposes (or something like it) is by no means unthinkable.15 But it also 
 
 13. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 14.  See id. at 831–32 (invoking § 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
701(a)(2) (2012), which withholds judicial review of “agency action [that] is committed to agency 
discretion by law”). 
 15.  See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, 
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2471 (2004) (“The fact that forty-
eight states employ such a structure . . . suggests that the idea [of a divided federal executive] is 
not all that radical . . . .”). 
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bears emphasis that most of those AGs are independently elected.16 
Elections offer a way—an imperfect way, but a way—for state AGs, like 
elected local prosecutors, to articulate their enforcement priorities to 
the public, and for the public to weigh in on those important policy 
choices. It’s hard to imagine a federal appointment procedure that 
served those functions. The theater of judicial confirmation hearings 
tends to focus on judges’ fidelity to a source of authority separate from 
the appointing President: the law itself.17 (That commitment, of course, 
goes a long way toward explaining the tradition of judicial 
independence.18) Nominees for Professor Claus’s independent AG 
position might make similar promises to “call balls and strikes,” as it 
were—thereby demanding an even more heroic suspension of disbelief 
from the rest of us and offering no meaningful information to the public 
and our representatives about what enforcement policy would actually 
look like. As unattractive as that vision is, it’s difficult to conjure up an 
alternative scenario in which AG nominees were candid about the 
massive discretionary power they would wield, and what they planned 
to do with it.  
But let’s bracket all that and suppose that the selection process 
works flawlessly on the front end. Questions of accountability at the 
back end remain. Professor Claus argues that AG independence is 
necessary given the current lack of checks on the President; he says that 
the “Presidency as a power center poses a uniquely great danger to 
liberty in lacking intra-institutional checks, because it comprises only 
one person.”19 I’m not sure that’s the right way of looking at it. The 
President is indeed one person, but the DOJ and the enforcement arms 
of all the agencies make up a huge bureaucracy that, in my view, create 
a significant set of informal checks. Other scholars have written about 
the importance of careerist lawyers and other civil servants, for 
example.20 There are other protections as well. Any prosecution that 
 
 16.  See id. at 2448 n.3. 
 17.  Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410–11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the 
prosecutor who represents “‘The People”‘; the judge represents the Law . . . .”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence?”, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 323, 330 (2002) (arguing that “the enablement of judicial review” was “the central goal of 
the architects of federal judicial independence”); see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999) (elaborating the argument). 
 19.  Claus, supra note 1, at 44. 
 20.  See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 540–47 (2015) (emphasizing the civil service as a critical component of the 
administrative system of checks and balances); Jon D. Michaels, Privatizations Pretensions, 77 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 717, 745 (2010) (“At times—especially when they must rely on professional civil 
servants—Presidents, governors, and mayors may find themselves statutorily and constitutionally 
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does go forward is subject to checks from the judicial branch. Our 
federalist system creates some protections against under- or non-
enforcement, since in many cases states have overlapping jurisdiction.21 
And for cases involving top-level executive officials, we have 
independent prosecutors in DOJ’s Office of Special Counsel.22 
As Professor Claus acknowledges, moreover, while there is no 
formal prohibition on the President firing the AG, there may be non-
binding conventions that constrain the President’s ability, or 
willingness, to dismiss the AG in order to stymie an investigation or 
prosecution.23 He says that “such a convention does not check as 
reliably and effectively as it would if it were backed up by constitutional 
protection for the investigators and prosecutors.”24 That’s surely true: a 
convention would not prevent the President from dismissing an AG in 
order to protect his political cronies or himself, or for any other bad 
reason. But I have less than perfect confidence that a constitutional 
amendment along the lines Professor Claus proposes would effectively 
check a President who was bound and determined to put an end to an 
investigation, no matter what. In both cases, it seems to me that what 
matters is the response—specifically, the political response. Professor 
Claus is quite right that presidential impeachment is a crude tool and 
is unlikely to be used to calibrate the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.25 But it’s a different question, I think, whether we might 
expect impeachment to be a viable response if the President were to 
breach longstanding norms concerning dismissal of the AG. Here, I’m 
not quite as pessimistic as Professor Claus—or maybe I’m more so, 
because if impeachment is so difficult to imagine under our current 
arrangements, then it seems to me that adding new “parchment 
barriers” won’t be much help. 
 
limited in their ability to control regulatory policy.”). 
 21.  Cf. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, No Pardoning This Offense, SLATE (Sept. 5, 2017) (“If 
Trump fires Mueller and his team, state attorneys general and state prosecutors can hire them. If 
Trump succeeds in pardoning the defendants or himself, state prosecutors can step in . . . .”), 
http://www.slate.com/ articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/09/states_could_ 
bring_these_charges_if_trump_tries_to_pardon_his_way_out_of.html. 
 22.  Special Counsel’s Office, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/sco (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2018). 
 23.  Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1202 (2013) (discussing longstanding norms against politicizing the DOJ, which permitted “en 
masse replacement of U.S. Attorneys at the time of a partisan change of administration, but 
barred targeted removal midstream”). 
 24.  Claus, supra note 1, at 41. 
 25.  Id. at 42. 
